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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
CARL R. SESSIONS,
Third-Party Defendant and
Respondent,

Case No.

11350

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
DONNE. CASSITY, EUGENE H. DAVIS, and FORD
G. SCALLEY, Attorneys representing numerous clients
whose interests coincide with the issue herein, were
granted leave by order of the court on November 8, 1968
to appear as Amicus Curiae. For the sake of brevity, the
Amicus Curiae accepts statement of the case and the
facts as set forth in Respondent's Brief and will limit its
discussion to matters which it feels merit consideration
to assist the court in determining the issues of whether
as a matter of law a right of subrogation of medical pay
coverage under the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company Policy does or does not exist.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AS
A MATTER OF LAW THE MEDICAL SUBROGATION
CLAUSE IN THE STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY AUTO POLICY WAS VALID.
The real issues presented by the question of whether
the medical subrogation clause in the State Farm Auto
Policy should be allowed, have been masked behind the
property damage subrogation doctrine. The insurance
industry has convinced some of the courts that subrogation is necessary to preclude "double recovery" or any
form of unjust enrichment. Such an appeal to emotion
should be inspected on its merits by this court and not
just accepted. The courts who have allowed medical pay
subrogation have failed to push analysis beyond anything
but consecrated phrases drafted by the insurance industry and have failed to formulate anew.

r

In looking at this problem logically and equitably we
find no valid reason for allowing medical subrogation
"privilege". An interesting analysis of this question which
is certainly apropos in this case is found in Richards, The
Law of Insurance, Vol. 2, Sec. 183, 184, pages 652 through
655:
"SECTION 183. Subrogation; Nature of the right
generally . . .
It has been often stated that subrogation is a creature
of equity growing out of natural justice or a desire
to work out a fair adjustment between parties by
securing the ultimate discharge of a debt. Subroga-
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tion is also described as a substitution of another
person in the place of the creditor to whose rights he
succeeds in relation to the debt, giving substitute all
the rights, priorities, remedies, liens and securities
of the person for whom he is substituted. Thus, upon
payment of loss or damage to the insured, the insurer
is entitled to be subrogated pro tanto to any right or
action which the insured may have against a third
party responsible for the loss or damage sustained by
the insured. This equitable right of subrogation is
derivative from the legal effect of payment and
inures to the insurer without any formal assignment
or any express policy stipulation.

However, upon closer examination it is submitted
that this equitable right of subrogation is neither
"equitable" nor a "right'', but constitutes a valuable
privilege bestowed upon an insurance company by
courts long indifferent to the doctrine of true indemnity in their zeal to respect the literal language of
such unilateral contracts of insurance. Courts have
mouthed the utterances of astute insurance counsel
that subrogation is necessary to preclude double
recovery by insured or any form of unjust enrichment gained from the prosecution of claims against
both the insurer and the tort-feasor causing the loss
of damage. But the same courts, not cognizant of the
impracticability of such double recovery by the insured have again overlooked the axiom that it is
equally unjust to preclude the insurer from suffering
a loss that it had expressly agreed to assume as a
risk in return for the payment of premiums. As Professor Patterson has so aptly commented 'Subrogation is a windfall to the insurer.' It plays no part in
the rate schedules (or only a minor one), and no
reduction is made in insuring interests such as that
of the secured creditors, where the subrogation right
will obviously be worth something. Hence in such a
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case no reason appears for extending it . . . 'The
doctrine of subrogation was conceived unilaterally
nurtured unilaterally, and cast on the courts for th;
unilateral interest of insurers generally. It must be
thoroughly re-examined from time to time.'"
"SECTION 184, Subrogation, and the Insurer
This right of subrogation affords the property insurer
one of its most valuable privileges, enabling it to
recover from a third person as much as it has paid
the insured under the policy for loss or damage."
We respectfully submit that the time has come for this
court to examine this attempt by the insurance industry to extend the property subrogation doctrine to
include the medical payment provision under an auto
policy or any other policy with the attendant circumstances of a unilateral insurance contract, the terms of
which are out of the control of the insured who has no
real bargaining position. We would agree that the sacred
right of freedom to contract must not be interfered with
as long as both parties to such contracts are on equal
footing. In the instant case justice demands that there be
some protection for the public when entering into such
unilateral contracts. If the insurance industry wants to
have this right to subrogate then they should be required
to offer to the insured a policy with such subrogation
privileges at a somewhat reduced rate, rather than receive the privilege of subrogation for nothing. Then and
only then will the principal of freedom of contract be
protected.
While the general doctrine of subrogation in property
damage cases should be re-evaluated there are at
least more convincing public policy considerations applicable to property damage subrogation than there are

i
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to justify subrogation in the area of medical pay coverage. The reasoning in the property damage cases for allowing subrogation is that such allowance discourages
carelessness. Such is not the case with medical pay subrogation where one is not likely to injure himself because
of the ability to pay. Since we as insureds have paid our
company to take the risk of negligent losses then why
should the company without consideration be permitted
to shift the loss to another.
While there may be many people who might be careless with their property, in our opinion, there would not
be many willing to intentionally injure themselves for a
few dollars. Those who would argue that there would
be many who would run up bills and costs because of injuries for a profit should be aware of the standard clause
which states that the company will only be obligated "To
pay reasonable medical expenses incurred within one
year from the date of the accident." See State Farm Auto
Policy 9520.6 MS Page 2, Coverage C - Medical Payments.
It should also be noted that these same insurance policies
state that "As soon as practicable the injured person or
someone on his behalf shall give to the company written
notice of claim, and upon request shall make medical reports and copies of records available to the company and
that the injured person when requested is required to
submit to physical examination by a physician selected
by the company. See State Farm Auto Policy, 9520.6MS,
Page 4 paragraph 12, Notice and Payment of Claim.
The above clauses which are standard in such policies
adequately protect the insurance company against fraud.
We ask this court to evaluate such public policy considerations instead of falling into the trap nurtured by the in-
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surers by finding a public policy reason to justify an end
result without specifically analyzing the problem for
purposes of intellectual rest. A good example of falling
into this trap is found in Traveller's Insurance Company
vs. Lutz 210 N.E.2d 755 (1964), a case cited in Respondent's Brief. In that case the court without any examination of the problem whatever stated, in general terms
that it found it impossible to see why it was unfair or a~
improper result to allow medical subrogation since the
parties were free to contract as they desired. The court in
Wilson vs. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. 411 S.W.
2d 699 (1966), likewise failed to evaluate the problem and
held with sweeping generalizations that no unfairness
existed in such contracts.
This court is now faced with the problem of whether
or not the insurance industry is going to be permitted to
extend the subrogation doctrine to the medical pay
clauses in auto policies. Such an extension cannot in logic
or equity be justified in light of careful analysis of the
public policy considerations. The argument made by the
Insurance Industry "that if medical pay subrogation is
not allowed the insured will get a double recovery" is
nonsense on stilts. The insured is getting from the insurer
what he paid a premium for while the company is paying
for what it agreed to take the risk for. The consideration
for receiving payment from the tort-feasor is that said
tort-feasor caused injury. The consideration for receiving
from the company the medical payments under the policy
is that the insured paid a premium. If medical subrogation is permitted, the "windfall" inures to the Insurance
Company where the sum of the premium is added not
deducted to the windfall. If subrogation is denied, the
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insured is getting what he paid a premium for, and at
least his "windfall" or "double recovery" is deducted by
the amount of the premium. Just who is really getting the
''double recovery"?
Subrogation has been nothing more than a source of
windfall to the insurers who have failed to reflect any
such anticipated recoveries in the computation of their
rates. The medical subrogation clause was first introduced in the State Farm policies in the early sixties. Their
new policies currently coming out are taking advantage
of the opportunity to extend the concept of subrogation
to include medical payments. By that they are creating a
"windfall" and escaping an obligation they agreed to asswne when they charged their premiums. Their new
policy issued September of 1968, Form No. 9520.7, page
13, Section 9, paragraph 2, cleverly provides as follows:
"Under coverages C and M, if the injured person has
other insurance of any type of a medical or surgical
reimbursement plan applicable to the payment of
such medical expenses, the company shall not be
liable for a greater proportion of such loss than the
applicable limit of liability bears to the total applicable limit of liability of all collectible insurance
against such loss."
For very convenient reasons the insurance industry
looks with abhorrence upon the situation where an insured is compensated for a premium he paid and also
from an injury he suffered. However, that same industry
also for convenient reasons sees nothing so abhorrent
when it accepts the full premiums from their insureds
and at the same time attempts to escape from the risk it
agreed to take. Medical pay subrogation penalizes those

8
individuals who have been prudent enough to pay for protection by sending in premiums. If subrogation is allowed
in this area of third-party tortfeasor liability the person
who does not have any insurance will in most instances
recover the same amount as the insured who pays the
extra premium. The medical pay subrogation clause
would penalize those of us who in our attempts to fill the '
medical cost gap have purchased more than one medical
policy in that we would only be able to recover once
despite the separate agreements to pay, and then under
the new pro-rata clause, even that one recovery would be
piece-meal, requiring us to negotiate with all the companies involved in order to collect much less than what
we paid for.
Further penalty would enure to the insured who pays
a premium for such coverage when he is involved in a
personal injury accident who must pay the costs of hiring
a lawyer to obtain a settlement or judgment for his pain
and suffering and medical expenses, when the costs of
such litigation must come out of his gross recovery.
Under the medical subrogation clause the insurance com·
pany is entitled to the entire amount of the medical pay
which it paid out without the insurance company having
to pay its fair share of the expense of collecting the same.
One need only take time to analyze this situation to con·
elude that the equities weigh heavily in favor of the
insured.
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POINT II
THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT
OF WHETHER OR NOT SUBROGATION SHOULD BE
EXTENDED TO INCLUDE THE MEDICAL PAYMENT
CLAUSE, SHOULD NOT BE DECIDED BY RESORTING TO ASSIGNMENT OF TORT DISTINCTIONS.
The cases cited by both Appellant and Respondent get
bogged down on whether the medical pay subrogation
provision is or is not an assignment of a personal injury
tort action. Such an approach begs any analysis of what
we are dealing with. Who cares whether it is or isn't an
assignment of a tort. The issue we are really faced with
is whether the doctrine of subrogation should be extended to include the medical payment provision under
a unilateral contract bargaining situation. SUBROGATION IS AN EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE. Since subrogation is an equitable principle, then we should decide the
issue in this case by resorting to what is equitable under
the circumstances and not by resorting to "fig-leaf" expressions of law which cover up blind ignorance. The
issue in this case should not be decided by resorting to
semantics but by what is equitable.
Respondent seems to rely quite heavily on the case of
Davenport vs. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 81 Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10 (1965). The court in that
case overruled the old common law doctrine of not allowing an assignment of a right to sue in tort for personal injuries and without any more analysis concluded
that there was no reason why medical subrogation could
not be allowed. The court in that case incorrectly ignores
the fact that subrogation is an equitable doctrine and
instead relied on the legal right to assign a tort.
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The Respondent on page 11 of his brief cites the case
of Travelers Insurance Co. vs. Lutz, 210 N.E.2d 755
(1964) and refers to language by that court which implies that as long as the State Insurance Commission has
full authority to control companies, and fails to take any
action to prevent an invalid policy provision, that such
policy provision must therefore be sustained. Such an
argument is ridiculous. For instance, the Utah State Insurance Commission failed to outlaw binding arbitration
provisions in Uninsured Motorists Insurance. The mere
fact some state government employees failed to ban such
a provision didn't keep the Utah Supreme Court in Barn- I1
hart vs. Civil Service Employees Insurance Co., 4 Utah 1
2d, 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965) from concluding that such
mandatory provisions were against public policy.
i
I

I

I

CONCLUSION
There should be no extension of the subrogation doc·
trine to include medical pay clauses in insurance con·
tracts there being no equitable basis on which to support
such an extension.
Respectfully submitted,
DONNE. CASSITY
EUGENE H. DA VIS
FORD G. SCALLEY
404 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

